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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
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See

Appendix 2.
United States Constitution, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See Appendix 3.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE V. BAKER, HOLDING REQUIRES THAT A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE INSTRUCTION BE GIVEN.
Inclusion of a lesser-included charge to the jury in a jury-

instruction has been repeatedly appealed.

The leading case on

the issue in Utah is State v. Bakerf 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983).
In State v. Baker the Utah Supreme Court gave an in-depth
analysis of the issue of lesser-included instructions and how to
determine whether or not to allow the additional charge to be
presented to the jury.

In the case at bar, both the State and

the defendant Mr. Simpson, base their arguments on interpretation
of the Baker, case.
The key point of contention between the State and Mr.
Simpson with respect to the holding in Baker, has to do with
whether there is a rational basis for acquittal on the charge in
the information, and conviction of the lesser included offense.
The standard which has evolved in this regard is called the
evidence-based standard, as is widely recognized:
The principal has, accordingly, evolved that the
submission of a lesser degree or an included crime is
justified only where there is some basis in the
evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher
crime, and yet guilty of the lower one.

1

State v. Baker at 157-158.
The key issue in the case at bar is whether Mr. Simpson can
conceivably be convicted of the sought after lesser included
offense, and acquitted of the charge in the information.
II.

DEFENDANT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTIVE
OF CONVICTION TO A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE.
The State argues that because Mr. Simpson asked for a lesser

included offense instruction, but did not present evidence in his
own behalf supporting conviction on the lesser included offense,
the court's decision not to give the requested instruction was
proper.

The State cites Driscoll v. United States, 356 F.2d 324

(1st Cir. 1966) in support of this proposition.

In Driscoll, a

defendant who was charged with wilfully failing to file an income
tax return requested a lesser included offense instruction for
non-wilfully failing to file a tax return.

The trial judge

refused to give the instruction because the defendant presented
no evidence to contradict the finding of wilfulness.
In Driscoll the court's holding was reasonable because The
defendant was asking for a non wilfulness instruction when the
only evidence before the court went to wilfulness.
In the case at bar, the Driscoll approach is not reasonable
because the charge in the information and the requested lesser
included offense both require willfulness.

Utah Code Annotated

Section 41-6-13 states as follows:
A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply
with any lawful order or direction of any peace
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or
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maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing
guard invested by law with authority to direct,
control, or regulate traffic.(emphasis added).
With respect to willfulness Section 41-6-13.5 of the Utah Code
Annotated states as follows in pertinent part:
An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal
form a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop,
operates his vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard of the
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of
any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a
peace officer by vehicle or other means is guilty of a
felony of the third degree...." (emphasis added).
In each statute there is a requirement of willfulness.
The evidence presented by the State apparently established
willfulness of some kind to the satisfaction of the jury.
question is what was Mr. Simpson willfully doing.

The

Was he

wilfully evading, or was he willfully disobeying the lawful order
of a police officer?
Despite the argument by the state, where both the charged
offense and the lesser included offense require willfulness, and
where the elements of each offense can be made out from the facts
presented to the jury, there is certainly no obligation placed on
Mr. Simpson to present evidence in his own behalf.
The State's argument that Mr. Simpson should present
evidence tending to prove his guilt of a lesser included offense
advocates violating the due process clause of Article I, Section
7 of the Utah State Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Furthermore, it

compromises Mr. Simpson's privilege against self-incrimination
protected by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution
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and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(See

Attached Appendix 2 and Appendix 3) .
Whether the state is attempting to convict Mr. Simpson of a
charged offense or a lesser included offense, the state has the
burden of proving all of the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.

This Court addressed this issue in State v.

Sorenson, where this Court stated:
Due Process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In
criminal cases, the prosecution is often aided by procedural
devices which "require (in the case of a presumption) or
permit (in the case of an inference) the trier of fact to
conclude that the prosecution has met its burden of proof
with respect to the presumed or inferred fact by having
satisfactorily established other facts." Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n.31 (1975). Since these devices
shift the burden of production or persuasion to The
defendant by requiring him or her to present some evidence
contesting the otherwise presumed or inferred fact, these
devices must satisfy certain due process requirements. Id.
"In criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evidentiary]
device's constitutional validity in a given case remains
constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's
responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the
State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985)
(quoting County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156, 60 L. Ed.
2d 777, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979)). The use of any mandatory
rebuttable presumption which "requires the jury to find the
presumed element unless The defendant persuades the jury
that such a finding is unwarranted" is one such evidentiary
device found to be unconstitutional. Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307, 314 n.2, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965
(1985). See also State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State
v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
In this case, the state conceded that it could not prove
that the offense of consumption was committed in Utah, but
nonetheless argued there is a "presumption" that consumption
occurred within the state unless rebutted by evidence to the
contrary. The court adopted this view and found that, absent
testimony to the contrary from defendant, the "natural
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inference" and "statistical probability" was that the
drinking occurred in the vicinity of the arrest.
Notwithstanding the court's characterization of its basis
for finding defendant guilty as a "factual assumption"
rather than a "legal presumption," we find the court's
approach unconstitutional because, semantics aside, it
creates precisely the type of evidentiary device prohibited
by Chambers and Turner. The approach "requires the
[fact-finder] to find the element unless The defendant
persuades the [fact-finder] that such a finding is
unwarranted." State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State v.
Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045.
Moreover, even if the evidentiary device used in this case
does not fit within the Chambers-Turner definition of a
mandatory rebuttable presumption, it nonetheless has the
effect of relieving the state of its burden of proof on the
fact of jurisdiction and is thus unconstitutional under the
standard articulated in In re Winship, requiring the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged. 397 U.S. at
364. ...
In this case, Sorenson's conviction of the offense of
consumption necessarily requires proof of the jurisdictional
factor that at least some alcohol was consumed in Utah. See
Utah Code Ann. @ 76-1-201 (1978). Though jurisdiction need
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it nonetheless must
be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code
Ann. @ 76-1-501(3) (1978). The state, however, put on
absolutely no evidence of jurisdiction but relied instead
entirely on the presumption that the consumption of alcohol
occurred within the state....
Without regard to the location of defendant's arrest, we
find the presumption or assumption used by the court
unconstitutional in that it shifted the burden of proof on
the fact of jurisdiction to defendant in violation of the
due process clause of Article I Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
State v. Sorenson, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 758 P.2d 466, (Ct. App.
1988).
Similarly, in the case at bar, the failure to give an
instruction because Mr. Simpson did not present evidence
establishing the elements of the lesser included offense violates
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the due process clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

The effect of the prosecution's

approach relieves the prosecution of its burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged.
Furthermore, requiring Mr. Simpson to present evidence
establishing the lesser included offense violates his privileges
against self-incrimination contained in Article I, Section 12 of
the Utah State Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

Under the state's scenario, Mr. Simpson

would be compelled to testify against himself in order to
establish the elements of the lesser included offense.

If Mr.

Simpson exercises his right not to testify, then the lesser
included offense is not given as an instruction.

In effect, Mr.

Simpson is penalized for exercising his privilege against selfincrimination.

This court suggested in Turner, that a defendant

"should not be penalized in any way for asserting his
constitutional right" to remain silent.

State v. Turner, 736

P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GIVE
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION.
In its brief, the State argues that defendant is not
entitled to a lesser included offense instruction because it is
not reasonable or rational.

The difficulty with this argument is

that whether the instruction was reasonable or rational based on
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the evidence presented to the jury was not the basis for the
trial court's decision.

The court stated:

Okay. The reason I did not include it, for the record,
is that the state does have the burden of proving each
and every element that has been charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the state fails to prove, in
effect, the last element of the eluding or fleeing
charge, then my instructions tell the jury they are to
find The defendant not guilty. I think that it is not
any loss, and not even in his best interest to have a
lesser included offense of which they might find him
guilty. If he is guilty of the offense as charged,
then the lesser included again is of no significance.
Its absence, I think, is probably in his best
interests. And counsel has noted his concerns and
reason for it, and the psychology of jurors. We don't
know what they do, but I think as a matter of law I
don't think there's a reason to include that lesser
included instruction or verdict form.
What the trial court did in the case at bar was to take the
decision regarding what was in the best interest of Mr. Simpson
away from counsel.

What the court did was make a decision

regarding trial strategy for Mr. Simpson rather than allowing Mr.
Simpson and his attorney to make the decision.

This is beyond

the discretion that is given to a trial judge.
In an apparent attempt to justify the trial court's actions
the State argues in its brief that in effect it was in
defendant's best interest not to have a lesser included offense
instruction.

This argument is based on defendant's trial

counsel's argument that Mr. Simpson may have "frozen" and not
been able to appropriately react to the situation.

The state

argues that if that argument is correct, defendant could not have
been convicted of either charge.
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The state's argument is based on the proposition that
willfulness on the part of Mr. Simpson

is the same for either of

the two charges.

To evade, defendant had

This is not correct.

to have an intent to evade.
willfully.

This had to have been done

This is different than willfully refusing to comply

with the lawful order of a police officer.

All defendant had to

do to commit this crime is to know that a police officer is
lawfully ordering him to stop, and decide not to stop.
different than making a decision to evade.

This is

Contrary to the

States argument, defendant could rationally willfully disobey an
order, and not willfully evade.
IV.

THERE IS A RATIONAL BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE FOR THE LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION.
The evidence showed that on March 8, 1994, Mr. Simpson was

traveling South in Millard County on Interstate 15. At mile post
163, deputies from the Millard County Sheriff's Department pulled
behind him in their vehicles. (R. at 76-79).

Mr. Simpson failed

to respond to the flashing lights of the officers' vehicles and
increased speed to 80 to 85 miles per hour.

Mr. Simpson

continued southbound on 1-15 for 11 miles to mile post 152.

(R.

at 79). At mile post 152, Mr. Simpson voluntarily stopped his
car, exited his vehicle, and turned himself over to the sheriff's
deputies.

(R. at 94-95).

Also brought out in trial was the fact

that Mr. Simpson did not continue to accelerate beyond the 80 to
85 miles an hour, nor did he attempt to take any exit along the
way or try to get away from the officers.
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(R. at 93). When he

came to a stop it was gradual and Mr. Simpson did not "hop out of
his vehicle and run," but complied with every one of the
officer's orders.

(R. at 94).

A review of these facts in the light most favorable to Mr.
Simpson clearly shows that there is a reasonable, rational basis
in the evidence for presenting the lesser included offense
instruction to the jury.

It is certainly within a reasonable

purview of the jury to adjudge Mr. Simpson innocent of the felony
but guilty of the misdemeanor.

CONCLUSION
Requiring Mr. Simpson to present evidence establishing the
elements of the lesser included offense in order that the jury
receive an instruction on the lesser included offense violates
the due process clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State
Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, relieves the prosecution of their
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged, and penalizes Mr. Simpson for
exercising his privilege against self-incrimination contained in
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution and the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Furthermore,

a review of the facts demonstrates that there was a reasonable,
rational basis for presenting the lesser included offense
instruction to the jury, which could have reasonably adjudged Mr.
Simpson innocent of the felony but guilty of the misdemeanor.
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The lesser included offense instruction, therefore, should have
been given.

In failing to do so, the trial court committed

reversible error.
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
trial court's ruling and grant Mr. Simpson a new trial allowing
the jury the opportunity to decide on the lesser-included
instruction of disobeying a peace officer.
DATED THIS

'^/[

day of May, 1995.

FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND P.C.
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APPENDIX 1

12

the current approved 'Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices," or that portion of the road
contiguous to the roadway for accommodation of
stopped vehicles, for emergency use, and lateral
support.
(42) "Sidewalk" means that portion of a street
between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a
roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for the use of pedestrians.
(43) "Solid rubber tire" means every tire of
rubber or other resilient material which does not
depend upon compressed air for the support of
the load.
(44) "Stand" or "standing" means the halting
of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other than
temporarily for the purpose of and while actually
engaged in receiving or discharging passengers.
(45) "Stop" when required means complete cessation from movement.
(46) "Stop" or "stopping" when prohibited
means any halting even momentarily of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or when
in compliance with the directions of a peace officer or official traffic-control device.
(47) "Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or
herded animals, vehicles, and other conveyances
either singly or together while using any highway for the purpose of travel.
(48) "Traffic-control signal" means any device,
whether manually, electrically, or mechanically
operated, by which traffic is alternately directed
to stop and permitted to proceed.
(49) "Trailer" means every vehicle with or
without motive power, other than a pole trailer,
designed for carrying persons or property and for
being drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed
so that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle.
(50) "Truck" means every motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained primarily for the
transportation of property.
(51) "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily for drawing other vehicles and constructed to carry a part of the
weight of the vehicle and load drawn by the truck
tractor.
(52) "Urban district" means the territory contiguous to and including any street, in which
structures devoted to business, industry, or
dwelling houses are situated at intervals of less
than 100 feet, for a distance of a quarter of a mile
or more.
(53) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or
by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or
tracks.
1987
41-6-1.5. Private vehicle as emergency vehicle
— Rules.
The commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety may make rules, consistent with this chapter,
governing the use, in emergencies, of signal lights on
privately-owned vehicles. The rules may include a

REGULATIONS
41-6-11. Chapter relates to vehicles on highways — Exceptions.
The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of
vehicles upon highways, except:
(1) where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section; or
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5
and Sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45 inclusive, which
apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout
the state.
1987
41-6-12. Violations of chapter — Penalties.
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a
class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided.
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 1 1 ,
15, and 17 of this chapter is an infraction, unless
otherwise provided.
1993
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other
traffic controllers.
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any peace
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing
guard invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.
(2) When flaggers a t highway construction or
maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall use
devices and procedures conforming to t h e latest edition of t h e "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways."
1987
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal
to stop — Fleeing — C a u s i n g property
d a m a g e or bodily injury — S u s p e n s i o n
of driver's license — Forfeiture of vehicle — Penalties.
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or
audible signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle
to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who
attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
The court shall, as part of any sentence under this
subsection, impose a fine of not less than $1,000.
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and
while so doing causes death or serious bodily injury to
another person, under circumstances not amounting
to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony
of the second degree. The court shall, as part of any
sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not
less than $5,000.
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under
this section or any other section, an operator
who, having received a visual or audible signal
from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop,
operates his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or
who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's
license revoked pursuant to Subsection

_ ,
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the conviction. If the court is unable to collect the
driver's license, the court shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is
the holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the driver's
license but shall notify the division and the division shall notify the appropriate officials in the
licensing state.
1993
41-6-13.7. Vehicle subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure.
(1) Any conveyance, including vehicles, aircraft,
water craft, or other vessel used in violation of Section 41-6-13.5 shall be subject to forfeiture and no
property right exists in it, except that:
(a) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a
common carrier may not be forfeited under this
section unless it appears that the owner or other
person in charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation of this chapter;
(b) a conveyance may not be forfeited under
this section by reason of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge
or consent; and
(c) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a
bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of a secured party who could not have known
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take place in the use of the
conveyance;
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this section
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon
notice and service of process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the property. However, seizure
without notice and service of process may be made
when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest to
search under a search warrant or an inspection
under an administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this section; or
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used in violation
of the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2),
proceedings under Subsection (6) shall be instituted
without unreasonable delay.
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having
urisdiction. When property is seized under this section, the appropriate person or agency may:
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated
by the warrant under which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it
to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
(5) When any property is forfeited under this secion after a finding of the court that no person is
ntitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited
a the custody of the Division of Surplus Property.
Tie director of the Division of Surplus Property shall

**w arraicuc»9 program regarding police pursuits.
Property forfeited under this section may not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against
any defendant in the case.
(6) When any property is subject to forfeiture under this part, a determination for forfeiture to the
state shall be made as follows:
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation
shall be prepared by the county attorney where
the property was seized or is to be seized. The
complaint shall be filed in the circuit or district
court if the property is not real property and the
value is less than $10,000. The complaint shall
be filed in the district court if the value of property other than real property is $10,000 or more
or the property is real property. If the complaint
includes property under the jurisdiction of the
circuit court and also property under the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court, the complaint shall be filed in the district court. The
complaint shall describe with reasonable particularity:
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known;
and
(iii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the
court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure
of the property which is the subject matter of the
action and deliver it to the sheriff for service,
unless the property has previously been seized
without a warrant under Subsection 41-6-13.7(2).
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the court clerk and served
together with a copy of the complaint, upon all
persons known to the county attorney to have a
claim in the property by one of the following
methods:
(i) upon each claimant whose name and
address is known, at the last known address
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose
right, title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy
of the notice and complaint by certified mail
to the address given upon the records of the
division, which service is considered complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be forwarded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are believed
to have an interest in the property, by one
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was
made.
(d) Any claimant or interested party shall file
with the court a verified answer to the complaint
within 20 days after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this chapter,
any interested person or claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court
having jurisdiction for release of his interest in
the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the
county attorney in the county of the seizure, who
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on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.L.R.3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=
83(1), 121 to 123.

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
O.eJ.Jtv. 3*

Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <s=> 82;
Weapons *=» 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent Hr>m»in cro«_

the power to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246,194 P. 122
(1920).
Dependents of employee killed by acts of
third party, a stranger to employment, are not

sation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9
(1927).
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248.
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266.
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275.
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
319.
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 47.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 129.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 613 to 617.
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§§ 1428 to 1437.
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state

criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55
A.L.R.4th 1196.
False light invasion of privacy—defenses
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244.
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57
A.L.R.4th 404.
Libel or slander: defamation by statement
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520.
Defamation: designation as scab, 65
A.L.R.4th 1000.
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfering with prospective civil action, as actionable,
70 A.L.R.4th 984.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law
*= 322, 324, 327, 328.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants,
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6.
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AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.

ection
[Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
[Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
[Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Jection 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
irisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
hey reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
rivileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
eprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
eny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

>ec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
heir respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
tate, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
)r the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
he members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitnts of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
Itates, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
rime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
rtiich the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
lale citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

>ec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
•resident and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
Jnited States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
lember of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
ny State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
upport the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec»on or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
hereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
isability.

